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vs. Multiple Equilibrium Models of Growth
Abstract: We look for permanent effects to per capita GDP from exogenous, temporary shocks. Our shocks are temporary changes to the export revenues of small,
open economies. We find no evidence that even the largest of these temporary
shocks, in excess of 9.7% of GDP, produce permanent effects to the growth path
of per capita GDP. The inability to reject a single-equilibrium world with shocks
of this magnitude suggests that multiple-equilibria, if they exist, are too widely
separated to be policy-relevant. Current aid initiatives, which are of a similar
magnitude, are not likely to deliver transition to a higher growth path.
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1 Introduction
Why do poor countries remain poor? Is it because they have chosen poor policies
– which might be amended – or because their poverty is self-perpetuating in a
manner beyond their control?
Neo-classical growth models predict conditional convergence implying
that countries with different policies and habits should expect to have different
long-run steady state growth paths. In these cases, poor countries should adopt
sound macroeconomic policies, encourage cultural change toward adoption of
more promising habits, and mitigate unfavorable geography as much as possible.
Eventually, as countries manage to adjust policies and habits and enjoy a run of
good luck, they will converge to the rich countries’ level of per capita output.
On the other hand, poverty trap models postulate that many of the behaviors
and policies which accompany poverty are self-perpetuating, hence the problem
cannot be fixed from within. This story is fundamentally different, suggesting
that poor countries remain poor not because they are doing something wrong,
but because of circumstances beyond their control. These models have thus frequently been used to justify the necessity of foreign aid to help countries escape
self-perpetuating poverty.
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Determining the extent to which external aid can deliver permanent, transformative benefits is a critical step in illuminating viable paths to development.
In a single-equilibrium world, external aid that does not reform the basic policies,
habits, and parameters of the economy will not change the balanced growth path
and will thus have no permanent effects. On the contrary, in a world of multiple
equilibria and poverty traps, aid can lift an economy onto a higher balanced growth
path, resulting in permanent improvement. Unfortunately, as we discuss below,
convincing tests that address the wide variety of potential poverty traps are elusive.
In this paper, we test the single-equilibrium world against the alternative
hypothesis of multiple equilibria. Our test borrows from work by Davis and Weinstein (2002, 2004) on economic geography. The central insight is simple. Assume
an economy starts in steady state and apply a large, temporary shock. If, long after
the shock has dissipated, the economy has failed to return to its steady state, then
we may conclude that the economy has been pushed into a new basin of attraction and found a new steady state thus implying a world with multiple steady
states. if, long after the shock has dissipated, the economy has returned to the
original steady state, then the shock was insufficiently large to push the economy
beyond the current basin of attraction. This cannot be taken as proof of a single
equilibrium world – the shock may simply not have been large enough to reach
the basin of attraction of the nearest alternate steady state – but the size of the
shock may be taken as a lower bound on the proximity of alternate steady states.
We use temporary changes to the export revenues of small economies as the
exogenous shock. The validity of the identification is discussed in detail in section
4.5. Our approach has the advantage that it does not resort to taking a stand on a
particular model of how poverty traps are delivered – savings, industrial spillovers,
institutions, etc. To preview our results: we find no evidence that temporary shocks
have permanent effects on the steady state growth path of an economy. This is true
even if we study only the very largest shocks, those most likely to push an economy
into a neighboring basin of attraction (see section 4.4). while not conclusive – see
section 5 for a discussion of caveats – the lack of discernable permanent effects from
temporary shocks of a plausible magnitude calls into question the policy-relevance
of the multiple steady states that are at the heart of many poverty traps models.
Our results also call into question the ability of development assistance to lift
recipient nations out of a poverty trap and onto a self-sustaining, higher growth
path. According to the World Bank World Development Indicators, worldwide
total official development assistance (ODA) in 2010 was 114.2 billion, or ~0.37%

1 The World Bank classifies countries into high, upper-middle, middle, lower-middle, and lower
income groups. Our use of these terms refers to aggregate data for these World Bank groups.
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of high income countries’ GDP.1 Official development assistance is not equally
distributed across countries. In 2010, low income countries received aid averaging 11.7% of GDP while lower-middle, middle, and upper-middle income countries received aid averaging 1.4%, 0.4%, and 0.1% of GDP respectively (source:
World Bank World Development Indicators). The ambitious Monterrey Consensus of 2002, reiterated in the Doha Declaration of 2008, called for an increase in
aid devoted to official development assistance (ODA) to 0.7% of rich countries’
GDP. If this increase in aid were to materialize and were similarly concentrated
on low income countries, it might constitute an additional 10% of GDP of low
income countries. Unfortunately, our results indicate that even the largest export
revenues shocks in our data – those in excess of 9.7% of GDP – have no permanent effect on a country’s growth path. As the magnitude of our largest shocks are
comparable to the magnitude of the largest aid flows, our results cast doubt on
the existence of a nearby higher growth path that can be reached via foreign aid.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews prior work testing for single
vs. multiple equilibria. Section 3 presents a simple model to motivate our empirical specification. Section 4 presents the data, empirical work, key results, and
robustness checks. Section 5 summarizes and concludes.

2 Prior Work
A large theoretical literature has proposed a wide variety of possible self-reinforcing mechanisms which can be broadly categorized into two classes. Models
of the first class stipulate a non-convexity in the aggregate production function
due to scale effects in the production of knowledge (Romer 1990) or spillovers
between firms or industries (Murphy et al. 1989; Boldrin 1992; Durlauf 1993).2
As a result, two countries with identical parameters – defined rather broadly to
include everything from savings rates and population growth rates to geography and even policy – may have different long-run steady-state growth paths.
As Krugman (1991) explains, this may happen either because countries had different initial conditions – meaning they had different levels of income at the
time when technological change introduced the non-convexity – or because
the actors within the countries coordinated on different expectations about the
future growth path.3
2 See Matsuyama (1995) and Azariadis and Stachurski (2005) for excellent surveys.
3 Krugman demonstrates that the relative importance of history and expectations depends on
(i) the cost of adjustment of the state variable, (ii) the interest rate at which future payoffs are
discounted, (iii) the strength of the increasing returns to scale that provide the positive feedback.
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The second class of poverty trap models comes from the idea that reforming
policy and household behavior is not a simple matter. This approach holds that
certain parameters are endogenous because there are powerful feedback loops
whereby low income countries find it extremely difficult to engender “good”
behaviors and institutions. Many such mechanisms have been advanced. A partial
list would include endogenous fertility (Becker et al. 1990); subsistence levels of
consumption limiting the savings rates of the poor (Azariadis 1996); the effects of
malnutrition on human capital and labor effort (Dasgupta and Ray 1986); financial market imperfections inhibiting the ability of the credit constrained to make
investments in physical and/or human capital (Galor and Zeira 1993); the effects
of poor health on human capital accumulation; increasing returns to corruption
as changes in social norms lower the probability of being caught and the resulting
penalties (Murphy et al. 1993; Tirole 1996); a vicious cycle between poverty and
conflict (Blomberg et al. 2006).4
Unfortunately, poverty traps models are rarely amenable to testing via standard cross-country growth regressions. Bernard and Durlauf (1996) point out that
cross-sectional tests of conditional convergence, which have generally rejected
the null of no-convergence, cannot distinguish between single and multiple-equilibrium models because the test simply requires that some pairs of countries are
converging over time but does not identify which pairs are converging or require
that a representative sample of pairs are converging. These tests can thus find
evidence of convergence even in a world with convergence clubs born of poverty
traps because pairs within a single club do converge.
Generally, models of the first type predict that the mapping from observable
parameters to income levels is not a single-valued function. Rather, the mapping
of current country-level characteristics to current levels of income depends on
which basin of attraction a country is in. In the most extreme case, good and
bad equilibria are differentiated only by self-reinforcing expectations about the
actions of others in the economy. Testing this theory would require reliable, crosscountry comparable measures of households’ and firms’ expectations about
the habits of others along whichever dimension – consumer demand, business
investment, fertility, human capital investment – is thought to deliver the multiple equilibria, a monumental task. It is similarly difficult to imagine how one
would falsify such a theory. In the less extreme case, a country’s steady state
growth path is set by historical experience. A poverty trap of this nature would
thus imply that the relationship between current observable parameters and
current income per capita is a function of initial conditions. A group of papers has

4 For a survey of these models see Bardhan (1997).
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used regression tree analysis or threshold estimation to sort countries into groups
such that countries within the same group exhibit a common aggregate production function (e.g., Durlauf and Johnson 1995; Hansen 2000; Durlauf et al. 2001;
Papageorgiou 2002; Canova 2004; Owen et al. 2009; Sirimaneetham and Temple
2009). These papers have convincingly demonstrated that aggregate production
functions differ significantly across groups, and that per capita income and literacy in 1960 can predict which group a country will belong to over the next 40
years. However, as both Durlauf and Johnson (1995) and Owen et al. (2009) admit,
the evidence from this line of inquiry is consistent with both models of multiple
steady states and models of unified growth and thus cannot constitute a test of
the poverty traps hypothesis.5,6
Poverty trap models of the second type admit per capita income as a singlevalued function of country characteristics, but explicitly hypothesize bidirectional causality. They suggest that per capita income, y, is both caused by and
causes a set of variables X capturing the mechanism of the poverty trap. Establishing a poverty trap in this case requires establishing significant feedback in
both directions, which necessitates separate instruments for per capita income
and each of the mechanisms of interest. Moreover, in order to deliver multiple
steady states, it must be that the relationship between y and X is non-linear in at
least one direction, complicating IV estimation.
As a result of these challenges, the literature testing for poverty traps at the
macroeconomic level is characterized by several indirect approaches. One group
of papers compares the observed evolution of the cross-country distribution of
income with the evolution predicted by models exhibiting single- and multiplesteady states. Quah (1996), Azariadis and Stachurski (2005), and Bloom et al.
(2003) are examples of this approach. Unfortunately, it can be difficult to determine whether twin peaks are driven by multiple steady states or a twin-peaked
distribution of the fundamental determinants of growth. A second approach,
best exemplified by Graham and Temple (2006) is to calibrate a structural model
admitting multiple equilibria. Using a two-sector variable returns-to-scale model,

5 For a survey of unified growth theory, see Galor (2005).
6 Moreover, given the limited data available, these methods are understandably limited in the
number of groups they can identify. As a result, Durlauf and Johnson (1995) admit, there might
be residual heterogeneity within each of the subgroups. Canova (2004) confirms the suspicion,
noting “the dispersion of steady states around each basin of attraction is significant, suggesting
that clustering is more prevalent than convergence even within groups” (p. 51). One thus wonders whether lackluster convergence within groups is due to non-convexities at a finer level. Our
paper addresses this issue: we find no evidence of barriers to convergence within clubs.
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Graham and Temple find that a quarter of their sample of 127 countries are best
characterized as in a low equilibrium. However, as they explicitly acknowledge,
the validity of such calibration rests heavily on the validity of the structural
model. A third approach is to ask whether the cross-sectional and time-series evidence is consistent with poverty traps hypotheses. For example, Rodrik (1998)
and Easterly (2006) look at growth accelerations to see whether they are also
accompanied by increases of the savings rate which would constitute evidence
for a savings-trap hypothesis. Kraay and Raddatz (2007) estimate savings rates as
a function of income per capita in a cross-section to determine whether it has the
nonlinear form required to deliver a savings-trap. Unfortunately, given the multiplicity of potential poverty trap mechanisms, finding a lack of evidence for one
particular mechanism does not disprove the general concept. Indeed, arguing
against the existence of poverty traps is a bit like playing whack-a-mole.
Finally, there is a well-developed literature on whether foreign aid (an external though not exogenous shock to per capita income) increases growth rates,
which might be taken as a sign that aid helps countries escape from a poverty
trap. Unfortunately, there is no clear consensus yet in this literature. Burnside
and Dollar (2000) conclude that aid helps when the institutional setting is right.
Collier and Dehn (2001) and Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) both find that aid
can mitigate negative terms-of-trade shocks. Hansen and Tarp (2000) review previous studies and conclude that, in small amounts, aid can help growth rates.
But Easterly (2004) warns that these results are fragile to definitions of growth,
aid, and “good” institutions and Werker et al. (2009) argue that most instruments
for foreign aid are flawed. Most importantly, these papers look at the increase in
the growth rate over a very short period (typically 4 years) concurrent with the
increase in aid. As such, they do not test whether aid contributes to permanently
higher levels of output from sustained output growth during a transition to a
higher steady state. In fact, when Easterly looks at the growth effects over longer
periods, the positive effects of aid disappear. Werker et al. similarly find no effect
on growth of exogenous increases in foreign aid. On the whole, no conclusive
pattern, either of confirmation or rebuttal of poverty trap hypotheses seems to
emerge from these studies.
We know of no other papers taking our approach – looking for permanent
effects of temporary shocks – for the macroeconomic study of poverty traps at
the economy-wide level. However, there is previous work at the household level
that takes a similar approach. McPeak and Barrett (2001) and Lybbert et al. (2004)
look at the effects of rainfall variation in east Africa on household assets through
herd loss. They document the existence of a poverty trap at the household level as
insurance against such shocks is not possible and those who lose their herds have
no recourse and fall into poverty. In so doing, they demonstrate that a temporary
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shock has a permanent effect on household wealth thus concluding in favor of
the existence of multiple steady states. Barrett et al. contains a helpful review of
related literature on poverty traps at the household level. This is an interesting
line of research which has generally found evidence in favor of poverty traps.
Because the mechanisms which deliver persistent poverty at the household level
need not be the same as those which deliver persistent poverty at the level of societies,7 and because prior evidence of poverty traps at the macroeconomic level is
inconclusive, we feel our work at the macroeconomic level is complementary to
work at the household level and remains of interest.

3 Exogenous Shocks: Simple Theory
To motivate the particular form of our regression, we present a variant of the
Ramsey growth model. The key difference is that the economy receives an exogenously determined level of export revenues which can be exchanged for imported
investment goods. Thus shocks to export revenues have a direct effect on GDP.
This enables us to derive a test of the role of temporary export-revenue shocks.
While it is well known that temporary shocks to per capita income do not affect
the steady state growth path in the Ramsey model, we feel the formal model
nonetheless serves two purposes. First, it provides a clean formal argument that
the temporary income shock we use as an instrument fails to produce permanent
effects.8 Second, it provides a structural form for our regression, helping to clearly
articulate our null hypothesis.
Consumers maximize the following inter-temporal utility function:
∞

U = ∫ e −( ρ−n)t ln ct dt
0

subject to the constraints:

yt = Aktα





(1)

(2)

7 See Barrett and Swallow (2006) for an excellent discussion of fractal poverty traps – poverty
traps at both micro and macro levels that spring from the same basic mechanism.
8 It has been suggested to us that temporary shocks can have permanent effects in a singleequilibrium world if they are invested in infrastructure. But this is precisely the behavior the
Ramsey model refutes by explaining that households will respond so as to keep the economy
on the steady state growth path. Werker et al. (2009) provide empirical corroboration by showing that exogenous foreign aid payments go largely toward increasing consumption rather than
investment.
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yt = ct + itd

(3)



kt = itd + itm − kt ( δ+ n)
itm = zt

(4)



(5)



where lower case letters denote per capita variables (i.e., divided by Lt). The equation of motion for the capital stock includes terms for domestic investment, id,
and imported investment goods, im, financed by export revenues, z. We assume
exogenous steady state TFP growth at a rate ζ. We then further assume that, in
addition to steady state technological growth, productivity can depend on a set of
production function shifters, Wt={W1,t, … , Wn,t} such as institutions, policies, and
structural variables. We assume that there is a given, known dynamic evolution
of these variables characterized by steady state levels Wss={W1,ss, … , Wn,ss}. We
assume that productivity depends on these shifters according to:
 n
At = ∏ Wj ,t
 j =1



( ) ( A e )
πj



ςt 1−α

0



(6)

So that the production function becomes

(

Y = wt K α ( A0 e ςt ) L
 n
wt ≡ ∏ Wj
 j =1

( )

πj

)

1−α







(7)
(8)

We are interested in the case where the economy starts at its steady state:
k0=kss corresponding to a given level of zt=zss and is perturbed by a shock to zt
which disappears gradually, in a way that we make precise below.
From the Hamiltonian and the necessary conditions that follow, we can
derive the equations of motion for consumption and the capital stock. Letting
“hats” denote quantities in terms of effective units of labor, we have:
cˆt = cˆt wt αkˆtα−1 − δ− ρ− ς
(9)


kˆt = wt kˆtα − kˆt ( δ+ n + ς)− cˆt + zt
(10)


(

)

which, together with the initial and terminal conditions, give us a system of differential equations for the state variables, k and c.
We assume that the data generating process for export revenues is:
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zt ≡

zt
= z ss ( 1+ θt ) ; θ < 1
kt


9

(11)

Thus describing a process whereby an initial shock decays exponentially.
Because Ramsey models are well understood, we relegate the details of the
solution to an appendix available upon request. As we demonstrate, solving the
model yields the following evolution of per capita income in response to a temporary shock:

{

}

limt→∞ [ln yt − ln y1 ]=− [ln y1 − ln y0 ]+ log w0 (e − ψt − 1) + P ln w0 (e − ψt − e − λ2 t ) + ςt (12)

Implying that the entire output-effect of a temporary export-revenue shock,
(y1–y0), is reversed in the long run once TFP growth and institutional change
have been taken into account. We take equation (12) as the basis for our empirical work.

4 Exogenous Shocks: Estimation
Our identification strategy relies on the use of temporary shocks to export revenue
as forces that could – in a world of multiple steady states – push an economy from
one steady state to another. In essence, a temporary shock will cause a one-time
change in per capita income from yt to yt+1 .If the economy is characterized by a
single steady state, then over the long-run the effect of the shock will evaporate
and the economy will, on average, return to its previous growth path. But if multiple steady states exist and the shock is sufficiently large, this initial impulse
will have permanent effects which remain long after the temporary shock has
dissipated.
The model developed in section 2 delivers a specification for this test as well
as the hypothesis for a single steady-state world. Equation (12) yields the following specification:
ln yi ,t +n − ln yi ,t + 1 = β 1 (ln yi ,t + 1 − ln yi ,t ) + β 2 ln wi ,0 + ςt + εi ,t +n



(13)

n

where εi ,t +n = ∑ j =0 ui ,t + j is the accumulation of a set of white noise disturbances to
income and w0 is a vector of production shifters. The null hypothesis.
H0 : β 1 =−1



(14)
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corresponds to a world with a single steady-state in which temporary deviations
from the steady state growth path do not translate into permanent deviations.
The alternate hypothesis is:
H 1 : β 1 =−1 + c



(15)

where χ is the effect of the temporary shock that remains after 25 years, which we
refer to as the “permanent” component. We will test β1=–1, implicitly testing χ=0.
The precision of our point estimates will define the range of χ consistent with the
data.
Are our regressions mis-specified under the alternative that multiple equilibria exist? Given the strong evidence for multiple growth regimes cited in the
previous section, there is instinctive suspicion that a linear regression based on a
Ramsey model must be mis-specified. The recent literature on growth regimes has
demonstrated that countries with different income and literacy levels are characterized by different aggregate production functions. But it should be noted that
we are not estimating a growth equation where constraining all countries to have
the same coefficients would be obvious folly in light of the recent literature. The
logic of our empirical approach – temporary shocks may or may not have permanent effects – is much simpler and explicitly admits a wide variety of production
functions, including non-convexities that deliver multiple growth regimes. Our
single-equilibrium model simply delivers the null hypothesis. Nonetheless, in
section 3.4, we rerun our estimates for sub-samples based on per capita income,
the most important splitting variable in the literature on growth regimes, so as to
allow for such regime differences. We find no change in our results.

4.1 Instrumenting with Temporary Export Revenue Shocks
The first complication is that this hypothesis describes the evolution of the
economy in response to exogenous shocks. If the initial deviation from steady
state comes from a change in fundamentals – such as enhanced TFP growth –
then there is likely to be a correlation between (ln yt+1–ln yt) and (ln yt+n–ln yt+1) that
will bias the coefficient estimates. To address this problem, we use the change in
export revenues as an instrument for (ln yt+1–ln yt). However, the previous argument suggests we are interested in whether temporary shocks deliver permanent
changes to steady state per-capita output. A permanent decline in export revenues would be expected to deliver a permanent decline in steady state output
per capita. So in fact, we are interested in the temporary component of changes
to export revenues. Thus we first filter export revenues to isolate their temporary
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component.9 Finally because the effects of changes can take a while to show up in
GDP figures, we include three lags.10 Hence our first stage regression is:
3

ln yi ,t + 1 − ln yi ,t = α0 + ∑ αk (ln zi ,t −k − ln zi ,t −1−k ) + ei ,t
k =1



(16)

where z is the temporary component of export revenues. Our instruments are
the (lagged) percentage change in export revenues that comes from temporary
shocks. We estimate (13) and (15) as a system using panel 2SLS with country fixed
effects. We use shocks that dissipate within 5 years and a horizon of 25 years.11
Because we have overlapping histories the error term in the second stage, εi,t from
equation (13), will be heavily correlated between successive observations from
the same country, thus we cluster by country. Finally, we control for initial level
of income to account for neo-classical convergence.

4.2 Data Sources
Data on per capita income comes from Penn World Tables 6.2. Data on export
revenues were taken from various volumes of the UNCTAD Handbook of International Trade and Development Statistics. These data were then standardized and
joined to form a single, consistent time series. The raw data include 130 developing countries with an average of 31 years of coverage per country. Our use of a
25-year horizon (explained in the next section) reduces the number of data points
considerably and eliminates many countries that have not yet been observed continuously over a 25-year period. As a result, we have 55 countries with an average

9 We have used the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter with plo=2 and phi=10. Thus the longest shock
deemed temporary dissipates in 5 years. In our early work, we compared a variety of different
filters including Hodrick-Prescott, Baxter-King, Butterworth, and a simple high-pass filter. Over
a variety of cases, the Christiano-Fitzgerald filter seemed to best capture the spirit of a temporary
shock to export revenues. The definition of temporary was chosen to be relatively short so as
to enable our regression, limited in length by the data set, to look for effects 20 years after the
original impulse has dissipated. A table showing that the results are robust to using any of these
other common filters is available upon request. See Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) for a helpful
discussion of band pass filters.
10 We have chosen this number of lags to maximize the first stage F statistic.
11 As a robustness check we have also looked at longer-lived shocks – those that dissipate within
10 years – as well as a shorter horizon of only 20 years. The statistical significance of certain coefficients change but the results are broadly upheld: there is no evidence of LR effects of temporary
shocks.
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of 15.8 data points each for a total of 871 data points. Table A1 lists the countries in the sample and the years in which the export-revenues shocks we follow
occurred.
We are somewhat hampered in our ability to implement the full equation by
the data on institutional quality. While many fine indicators have been developed, measured, and brought to bear in cross-country growth regressions and
other work, panel data are available for very few of them. For the most part, they
are either time-invariant or measured only once. While equation (13) requires only
a measure at the beginning of the shock, we will be looking at shocks starting at
any and all dates in the sample, thus we need a panel measure. In lieu of this, we
have for the moment used fixed effects to gather the entire set of country-specific
shocks: both those that can be measured with specific institutions and those that
cannot. Since we are not explicitly interested in the effects of these institutions,
the bundling into a single fixed effect is not a concern. In the one instance where
we can find reliable panel data on institutional quality, the measure of democracy
from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2008), we include it explicitly.

4.3 Results
The results using export revenues as the instrument are presented in column
(1) of Table 1. The first stage passes both Craig-Donald tests at the highest confidence level mitigating concerns about weak instruments. Column 2 adds the
polity score, of the few indicators of institutional quality with sufficient variation
to stand out from the country fixed effects.12 It does not change the character of
the results. To address concerns that our sparse specification may omit relevant
covariates, we can also include standard Solovian growth factors: primary and
secondary schooling rates, population growth rates, net national savings rates.
We can further add summary measures of macroeconomic policy: general government final consumption expenditure as a share of GDP and the consumer price
inflation rate. None of these controls, singly or as a group, change the results and
interpretation that follow.
The results cannot disprove the null hypothesis. The point estimate is virtually identical to –1, suggesting that the per-capita income effect of a temporary
shock to export revenues completely dissipates over the 25-year horizon in ques12 Unfortunately, while there are many, many indicators of institutional quality which have been
targeted in growth regressions, time-varying measures are available for very few of them. Most
of them – such as rule of law – are measured only very infrequently and exhibit very little intertemporal variation and are thus collinear with our country fixed effects.
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Table 1 Full Sample.
ln yt+25–ln yt+1
Instrument
t

(ς)

ln yt+1–ln yt+0

(β1)

Polity

(β2)

N
Second stage within-R2
Craig-Donald First-stage Wald F-statistic
Shea partial R2
Sargan overidentification
c2 p value
c2 test (β1=–1)
Prob>c2

(0)

(1)

Terms of trade
0.005
(0.0021)**
–0.818
(0.297)***

Export revenues
0.006
0.005
(0.0013)***
(0.0013)***
–1.006
–0.994
(0.126)***
(0.122)***
–0.002
(0.0012)
898
871
0.617
0.630
22.12
22.31
0.073
0.076
0.171
0.434
0.918
0.805
0.00
0.00
0.959
0.963

898
0.617
1.871
0.013
0.698
0.983
0.37
0.541

(2)

Standard errors reported.
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
Unreported controls: lnyt+0.
We estimate equation (13) with two instruments. First we use shocks to TOT. Unfortunately,
this is a weak instrument whose results are likely biased toward 0. Thus we focus on shocks to
export revenues for the remainder of the paper. The point estimates are very close to 1, suggesting that the entirety of the resulting change in GDP is reversed over the next 25 years.

tion. It is also estimated with reasonable precision thanks to the strength of the
instrument. In our basic specification (Table 1, column 2), the 95% confidence
interval is [–0.76, –1.25]. A true coefficient in the interval (0, –1) represents a mix of
temporary and permanent effects. So our confidence interval does admit a range
of parameters in which temporary shocks have permanent effects. Nonetheless,
while the results do not preclude all permanent effects, the narrow confidence
band seems to rule out a shift to a dramatically different basin of attraction.
The reader may wonder why we have chosen export revenues as our instrument rather than terms of trade, which would capture shifts in both import and
export prices. We have reported results using terms of trade in column 0 of Table 1.
Unfortunately, as you can see from the first stage F-statistic, the temporary component of terms of trade is simply too weak an instrument for changes in output per
capita. Hahn and Hausman (2002) show that the sign of the weak instrument bias
in 2SLS regressions is the sign of the correlation between the endogenous variable
and the error term in the OLS specification. In our case, that would be positive,
offering a possible explanation for why the coefficient estimate using the weak
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instrument is less negative (closer to zero). In any case, the results remain similar:
the statistic is strongly distinguished from zero and indistinguishable from –1.
Hence even this much weaker instrument supports the conclusion that temporary
shocks do not result in discernable permanent changes in income per capita.

4.4 R
 obustness: Large Shocks Only and Differentiating
Between Rich and Poor
We feel two critiques are especially relevant and address them directly with additional regressions.
Big shocks only: In the long run, an economy remains near its steady state.
The theoretical argument was that, in a world of multiple equilibria, an exogenous shock may push an economy from one basin of attraction to another and
thus the long run will be characterized by a different steady state. But this can
happen only if the shock is sufficiently large. Shocks that are below the threshold
result in no long-run effect, even in a world of multiple equilibria. The current
strategy is biased against finding an effect because the ineffective small shocks
are included along with the large shocks. Therefore, we ought to focus only on the
largest shocks, to see whether they have long-term effects.
In order to isolate the largest shocks, we calculate the cumulative 3-year
shocks to export revenues, take the absolute value, rank them, and then take
the largest 1/n of these shocks. Choosing the value of n determines how large the
shock must be to be considered. For example, if n=2, then we look only at the
effects of half of the shocks. We use n=2, 5, and 10. Table 2 gives the percentiles of
the absolute value of the three-year cumulative export shocks. Thus for n=2, we
are using shocks that are at least 11.1% of exports, for n=10, we are using shocks
that are at least 43.4% of export revenues. How big are these shocks in terms of
GDP? Exports average just over 30% of GDP in our sample, so the effect on GDP
is typically smaller by a factor of 3 or 4. Table 2 also reports percentiles for the
one-year shocks to GDP.
In order to test the hypothesis that only large shocks have an effect, we generate a new instrument, η, which equals the cumulative 3-year shock to export
revenues if this cumulative shock is large enough to make our cutoff but is set to
zero if the shock is too small to pass the cutoff.13
13 The switch from using the last three periods as separate instruments to summing them and
using the cumulative change as the instrument comes because our method of zeroing out the
small shocks leads to excessive collinearity between the instruments if used separately (they all
have zeros in the same place).
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Table 2 Size of the Shocks.
Cumulative % change in
export revenues over past
3 years (absolute value)
2

∑ (ln z
k =0

t −k

25th Percentile
50th Percentile
75th Percentile
90th Percentile
95th Percentile

Total change in GDP/capita

−ln zt−k−1 )

ln yt+1 −ln yt

4.6%
11.1%
25.0%
43.4%
61.7%

1.47%
3.31%
6.02%
9.71%
13.01%

Shows the distribution of the export revenue shocks. The left-hand column shows the total size
of the shock: e.g., the median shock is 11.1% of exports. The right-hand column shows the
size of change in output associated with the export revenue shock. Here the median shock to
export revenues produces a 3.3% shock to GDP.
3

η = Dlarg e ∗∑ (ln zi ,t −k − ln zi ,t −k −1 )
k =1


1
Dl arg e = 
0


if
else

3

∑ (ln z
k =1

i ,t −k



(17)

− ln zi ,t −1−k ) ≥ cutoff

The results are reported in Table 3. The results confirm the previous pattern:
we cannot reject the hypothesis that temporary shocks to export revenues have no
permanent effects on per capita income. This is true for even the largest shocks,
those between 0.4% and 2% of GDP. The first-stage F-statistics show this modified
instrument is much stronger than the original and the standard errors and confidence interval are correspondingly smaller.
Rich vs. Poor: Multiple steady-states arise because of a non-convexity in the
Solow diagram. But it does not necessarily follow that non-convexities exist near
every country’s steady state. Rather, different countries may be in different equilibria with different basins of attraction and thus the shock required to escape
the current basin of attraction may be of different sizes. Depending on the mechanism generating the non-convexities and thus the multiple steady states, the
shape of the basin of attraction, and thus the size of the shock required to trigger a
permanent transition to a new steady state, might depend on many country-specific variables. Canova (2004) states “[a]mong the indicators suggested by theory,
the distribution of income per capita at the beginning of the sample seems to be
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Table 3 Large Shocks Only.
ln yt+25–ln yt+1
Fraction of shocks included
Smallest shock included (% of X-revenues)
(% of GDP)
t

(ς)

ln yt+1–ln yt+0

(β1)

Polity

(β2)

N
Second stage within-R2
Craig-Donald First-stage Wald F-statistic
Shea partial R2
Sargan overidentification
c2 p value
c2 test (β1=–1)
Prob>c2

(3)

(4)

(5)

1/2
11.1%
3.3%
0.004
(0.0013)***
–1.034
(0.097)***
–0.002
(0.0012)
871
0.629
37.12
0.121
1.819
0.403
0.12
0.728

1/5
29.4%
6.6%
0.004
(0.0012)***
–0.974
(0.069)***
–0.002
(0.0012)
871
0.631
82.61
0.234
0.970
0.616
0.14
0.711

1/10
43.4%
9.7%
0.004
(0.0012)***
–1.019
(0.065)***
–0.002
(0.0012)
871
0.628
101.44
0.273
0.451
0.798
0.09
0.7678

Standard errors reported.
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
Unreported controls: lnyt+0.
Only shocks large enough to push a country into an adjacent basin of attraction should have
long-term effects. Thus we re-estimate equation 13 with a dependent variable that is nonzero only the largest shocks. Shocks not meeting a threshold are set to zero, as per equation
16. Each column represents a different threshold: the first column zeros the smallest 50%
of shocks so as to concentrate on the largest 50%. The second and third columns allow only
the top 20% and 10% of shocks through respectively. In all cases, the point estimate remains
close to 1, suggesting the effect of the shock is fully reversed within 25 years.

the one with the highest information content” regarding which convergence club
the country will join (p. 65). Thus we split our sample into low- and high-income
countries and re-run the regressions separately within each sub-sample. We have
produced the split in two different ways: first by considering whether per-capita
income was in the top or bottom half of the entire sample; second by considering
whether per-capita income was in the top or bottom half for the particular year
in question.
The results are reported in Table 4. Not surprisingly, the instrument is weaker
for the upper half of the income distribution. Nonetheless, for the poor countries,
for which the instrument is sufficiently strong, we remain unable to reject the null
of no permanent effects and our confidence interval is similarly tight, once again
implying that if permanent effects do exist, they are quite moderate.
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Table 4 By Income.
ln yt+25–ln yt+1

(11)

(Range for y: real 2000 USD)
t

(ς)

ln yt+1 – ln yt+0

(β1)

N
Second stage within-R2
Craig-Donald First-stage
Wald F-statistic
Shea partial R2
Sargan overidentification
c2 p value
c2 test (β1=–1)
Prob>c2

(12)

(13)

(14)

Upper and lower halves of
entire dataset
330–2000 2000–28,800
0.003
0.011
(0.0017)*
(0.0022)***
–1.025
–1.068
(0.111)*** (0.509)**
444
452
0.687
0.574
16.81
4.83

Upper and lower halves by
year
330–2350 1770–28,800
0.004
0.105
(0.0016)** (0.022)***
–1.032
–0.968
(0.111)*** (0.535)*
437
454
0.695
0.559
16.60
4.52

0.110
0.743
0.690

0.034
0.663
0.718

0.110
0.301
0.860

0.031
0.480
0.787

0.05
0.820

0.02
0.893

0.08
0.771

0.00
0.952

Standard errors reported.
Significance levels: *10%, **5%, ***1%.
Unreported controls: lnyt+0.
Splitting the sample in half by income to test whether export shocks are equally impotent for
low and high income countries. Country-years may be classified relative to the entire dataset
(left) or relative to the year in which they occur (right). Notice that the instrument is much
stronger for poor countries than for rich. Nonetheless, the point estimates remain close to 1 for
both groups.

4.5 Is the Instrument Valid?
The strength of the first stage F-statistics, generally passing the Craig-Donald
critical values at the highest levels, suggests that the instrument is not weak.
However, one might worry as to whether the instruments from equation (15) are
correlated with the error from equation (13). For the small economies under discussion, it is commonly agreed that commodity prices are exogenous (see Collier
and Gunning 1999). Nonetheless, there are complex feedbacks between export
revenues and total output and, not surprisingly given the complex time-series
behavior of GDP, there is some doubt as to the direction of Granger causality
between the two.
There are two important aspects of our empirical approach that combine to
guard against reverse causality. The first is the use of lagged changes to export
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revenues. The second is the use of the temporary component of export-revenues
as the instrument for GDP. Here are three examples illustrating the robustness of
the technique.
Scenario A: An adverse productivity shock in the home-country’s export industry.
For example, a major export industry is nationalized leading to poor management
and poor investment decisions.
Shocks to export revenues – which then may or may not spread to GDP – are
precisely the channel of interest. The only way this scenario causes endogeneity problems is if the productivity shock is caused by prior changes to GDP. For
example, GDP growth is poor leading to the election of a government which then
nationalizes export industries causing productivity to decline. It has been shown
that leftist governments are less likely to respect existing property rights (Vaaler
et al. 2005). To test this channel, we estimated a probit of the probability that a leftwing government is elected as a function of the past 4 years of GDP growth and the
identity of the previous government.14 We repeated the exercise for both the executive and legislative branches. The results, reported in Table 5, show no systematic
relationship between past GDP growth and the partisan affiliation of government:
the eight coefficients show no consistent sign and only one is significant at even
the 10% level. Thus, while this channel this is possible, we do not think it sufficiently common to endanger our approach.
Scenario B: An increase in home country GDP (perhaps due to an exogenous
increase in productivity in non-tradable sectors) leads to an increase in domestic
demand and thereby a decline in the excess-supply of the export-good and thus a
decline in exports.
This looks to be a genuine case of reverse causality: an effect starts in GDP
and moves to export revenues. First, note that if this is a permanent shock, then
we have a permanent decline in export revenues which does not get past our
filter. But if it is a temporary shock, it is true that we will measure the reversal of
the shock as a decline in GDP akin to that of the return to steady-state in a singleequilibrium world. However, because the instrument is lagged, the instrumented
value of (yt+1–y1) will not pick up the change to export revenues caused by this
shock. Hence the decline in (yt+25–yt+1) will simply be part of the error term.
Scenario C: A common shock that affects GDP in both the country in question and
its trade partners. For instance, FDI dries up for an entire region due to investor
14 We have no reason to believe left-wing governments are either better or worse for TFP growth.
Governments are classified as either left or right and thus this is a binary variable.

Brought to you by | The Claremont Colleges
Authenticated | 134.173.131.91
Download Date | 4/20/13 1:05 AM

Testing for Poverty Traps

19

Table 5 Income Growth and Partisan Government.
[15]

[16]

[17]

[18]

Method of estimation: panel probit
Dependent variable: prob(government elected is left-wing)
Government in question

Executive

Previous government was left-wing

0.82
(5.81)***
2.36
(0.72)
0.35
(0.15)
–2.46
(0.93)
–0.59
(0.30)

1.85
(10.57)***
0.51
(0.30)
0.73
(0.44)
–2.72
(1.67)*
0.52
(0.35)

–2.08
(6.03)***
132
42
0.24

–1.30
(11.70)***
353
74
0.32

GDP growth year t–1
GDP growth year t–2
GDP growth year t–3
GDP growth year t–4
Dummy (Hyper-Inflation in year t)
Constant
Observations
Countries
Pseudo R2

Largest Executive
Largest
governing party
governing party
in legislature
in legislature
0.88
(5.86)***
3.09
(0.93)
1.15
(0.48)
–1.47
(0.54)
–0.56
(0.29)
0.49
(1.49)
–2.32
(5.90)***
132
42

1.84
(10.51)***
0.51
(0.30)
0.94
(0.56)
–2.53
(1.55)
0.46
(0.32)
0.18
(0.86)
–1.30
(11.70)***
353
74
0.32

z-Statistics reported: ***1%, **5%, *10%.
Looking for a systematic relationship between past GDP growth and the election of left-wing
governments, controlling for the partisan affiliation of the previous government. Data on the
partisanship of government and the identification of election years for the relevant branch of
government come from the 2007 Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2001). Hyperinflation is defined as an annualized rate of inflation above 40%. While inference is somewhat
hampered by large standard errors, it is clear that there is no consistent pattern of signs.

herding and poor differentiation by foreign investors among the various countries
in the region.
If this were a permanent shock, then the change to export revenues would
not pass our filter and, as with scenario B, it would simply enter the error term.
However, if this were a temporary shock, we could see a temporary effect on GDP
and a temporary effect on export revenues, both caused by the external event.
This event would deliver spurious correlation if the decline in foreign country
GDP occurred prior to the decline in home country GDP, thus giving a pattern
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whereby export revenues decline first, and then home country GDP follows, but
is not caused by the decline in export revenues.
To investigate further the role of fluctuations in trade-partner GDP, we constructed a trade-weighted measure of trade-partner GDP and extracted the temporary component to such fluctuations, as per the filtering method described
above. We then estimated equation (13) using this measure as the instrument for
shocks to home-country GDP instead of shocks to export revenues. It turns out
this measure is an unbelievably weak instrument, too weak for reliable results.
At first blush this would seem to be at odds with the much-replicated results from
the gravity models of trade. Upon further reflection, it is in fact evidence regarding a different frequency of fluctuation. Gravity models are estimated on crosssectional data and thus constitute evidence for long-term stable relationships.
Our exercise was evidence of the high-frequency correlation between trade partners’ GDP. This weakness of the high frequency correlation suggests that we need
not worry too much about endogeneity from scenario C.
To reiterate, because our instrument is both filtered and lagged, it is difficult
to tell a story of a type of shock which is likely to deliver reverse causality with
the requisite lag structure. Such stories are not impossible, but they seem neither
likely nor commonplace.15 It is also worth reiterating that weak instrument bias
and endogeneity bias are likely to bias the coefficient upwards and thus closer to
0 rather than –1.

4.6 How Big are these Shocks?
Our estimates fail to find discernable permanent effects of temporary shocks to
per-capita income due to changes in export-revenue. The implication is that there
is no alternate steady-state nearby into which a shock may jostle an economy.

15 Perhaps the most frequent comment we receive is that shocks to export revenues do not occur
ceteris paribus but may themselves cause changes in the economy. For example, a jump in the
world price of natural resources may lead, via the voracity effect (Tornell and Lane 1999) to a
jump in taxes and transfers thereby inhibiting future investment causing a productivity slowdown. Might concomitant effects then obscure or offset the transition between equilibria, confounding our empirical strategy? Of course such channels exist: the strength of these effects
is precisely what we attempt to measure. We have tried to argue in this section that our identification strategy remains valid. In essence, such comments suggest there might exist several
feedback loops, some that amplify shocks and deliver multiple equilibria, others that dampen
or reverse shocks. It is true that we cannot separately identify the various channels. We feel it is
more relevant to measure and address the mix that exists in practice.
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Nonetheless, because our shocks are of limited size, we cannot rule out the possibility that an alternate basin of attraction exists beyond the range of these shocks.
Thus, rather than a repudiation of multiple steady-states, these results deliver
a lower bound on the size of the basin of attraction in which an economy currently rests. Table 2 shows that these shocks are not inconsiderable. For our basic
specification using the whole sample (Table 1), the median shock is a cumulative
change of 11.1% of export revenues (3.3% of GDP) over 3 years. When we limit the
sample to the largest shocks (Table 3), we are, by the end, looking only at shocks
in excess of 43.4% of exports (9.7% of GDP). Thus we have evidence that shocks
with considerable impact on current GDP have no discernable permanent effect
on the steady state growth path.
It is true that while these largest shocks represent considerable fractions of
domestic GDP, they are nonetheless small compared to the cross-country differences in income that models of multiple equilibria seek to explain. We cannot yet
rule out multiple equilibria as an explanation for convergence clubs. However,
such models are clearly less interesting from a policy perspective if shocks that
are empirically plausible fail to shift an economy from one equilibrium to another.
In particular, the case for foreign aid frequently invokes the idea of providing sufficient extra resources to push an economy from stagnation to sustained
growth. Kraay and Raddatz (2007) note “recent calls for across-the-board debt
relief and a major scaling up of aid to help poor countries achieve the Millennium
Development Goals have been significantly influenced by the idea that these
countries are stuck in poverty traps and that major pushes are required to break
free of these traps” (pp. 315–316). As we explain in the introduction, low income
countries received aid averaging 11.7% of GDP in 2010. The Monterrey Consensus calls for increasing official development assistance from the current 0.37%
of high countries GDP to 0.7%, an increase of 89%. If similarly concentrated on
low-income countries, this would produce additional aid averaging 10.4% of
low income countries’ GDP. Unfortunately, our results show that shocks of this
magnitude do not produce permanent effects (Table 3, column 5) casting doubt
on the existence of growth paths which are sufficiently proximate to be reachable through foreign aid.16 While many justifications for foreign aid remain, our
results suggest that enabling escape from a self-sustaining poverty trap is not one
of them.

16 It is sometimes noted that aid is not a temporary shock, but a permanent flow. Even so, if a
movement of this magnitude does not produce an escape from the poverty trap, there will be no
additional effect. Standards of living will be increased by the amount of foreign aid, for as long
as it is sustained, but there will be no sustainable take-off to sustained growth and convergence.
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5 Conclusion
There are a variety of theoretical mechanisms capable of generating self-reinforcing
poverty. Traditional macroeconomic tests of poverty traps often have trouble distinguishing between a world characterized by multiple steady states and a world characterized by twin peaks in the distribution of parameters. We focus on one clear distinction between these two worlds: large, temporary, exogenous shocks to per capita
income ought to lead to permanent effects if alternate steady states exist nearby.
We construct a modified Ramsey model including technological growth to
inform our specification. Motivated by the model, and by the widespread view that
export revenues are exogenous to small open economies, we use export revenues
as our shock and look for permanent effects on the growth path of per capita GDP.
We check that the effect is robust to non-linearity in the size of the shocks. We also
check that the effect is robust to countries in different growth regimes as per recent
literature. In all specifications, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis of no
permanent effects suggesting a world with a single proximate steady state.
Several caveats are in order. First, while our point estimates are very nearly
–1, our 95% confidence interval typically stretches from –0.76 to –1.25 (see Table
1, column 2). This range admits a number of coefficients that are consistent
with some small permanent effect. However, it is clearly sufficiently narrow to
rule out the dramatic shift to a new basin of attraction envisioned by poverty
traps models. Shocks of plausible magnitude are unlikely to deliver a take-off
(or collapse) resulting in a change in a country’s convergence club membership.
Second, one might reasonably claim that these export-revenue shocks are not
large enough to conclusively demonstrate the non-existence of multiple steadystates given the huge range of variation in income across countries. We agree.
Nonetheless, our results constitute evidence that even shocks larger than 9.7% of
GDP leave no discernable permanent impact on a country’s steady state growth
path. Third, it is possible that short-run fluctuations in export revenue are not
relevant to certain feedback loops. For example, suppose the quality of a country’s legal institutions tend to improve with per capita income. Are institutional
reforms likely to make great strides in response to a 3-year period of greater export
revenues? Perhaps. A government with full coffers has a greater capacity to, for
example, pay judges and policemen and combat judicial corruption. However, it
is reasonable to suppose that short-lived revenue influxes do little to systematically improve institutions. As a result, our test may be a less convincing rebuttal
of feedback mechanisms displaying considerable inertia.
Despite these caveats, the lack of discernable evidence of long-lived growth
effects from short-run shocks of empirically plausible magnitudes raises the
question of whether development models of multiple equilibria are relevant to
decisions available to policymakers.
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Appendix
Table A1 The Sample of Countries and the Years of the Initial Shocks.
Country

Years of Initial
Shock

Freq.

1962–78
1962–79
1972–78
1962–78
1962–78
1962–78
1962–79
1962–78
1970–78
1962–79
1962–78
1962–78
1962–79
1962–78
1962–78
1962–79
1962–78
1962–78
1962–79
1965–78
1962–78
1962–78
1962–79
1962–78
1962–78
1963–78
1962–79
1962–79

17
18
7
17
17
17
18
17
9
18
17
17
18
17
17
18
17
17
18
14
17
17
18
17
17
16
18
18

Algeria
Argentina
Bangladesh
Benin
Bolivia
Brazil
Burkina Faso
Cameroon
C. Afr. Rep.
Chile
Colombia
Congo
Costa Rica
Côte d’Ivoire
Dom. Rep.
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Gabon
Gambia
Ghana
Guatemala
Honduras
India
Jordan
Kenya
Korea, Rep.
Madagascar

Country
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Morocco
Mozambique
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Pakistan
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Rwanda
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Somalia
Sri Lanka
Thailand
Togo
Trin. & Tob.
Tunisia
Uruguay
Venezuela
Zambia

Years of Initial
Shock

Freq.

1964–79
1962–78
1962–79
1970–78
1968–79
1962–79
1962–78
1975–78
1962–79
1962–79
1962–79
1962–79
1962–78
1962–78
1962–79
1962–78
1962–78
1970–79
1970–79
1962–71
1962–78
1962–79
1962–65
1962–79
1962–79
1962–79
1964–78

16
17
18
9
12
18
17
4
18
18
18
18
17
17
18
17
17
10
10
11
17
18
4
18
18
18
15
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